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Introduction
Sleeping sickness (human African trypanosomiasis) 
is a parasitic disease spread by the tsetse fly across a 
large belt of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is one of the great 
stories of success – and failure – of public health in the 
twentieth century. Nearly all conventional histories, 
such as those found in project proposals written 
by international organisations or in World Health 
Organisation (WHO) documents, begin by recounting 
the story of the disease’s ‘U-shaped’ curve on graphs 
depicting reported cases on the continent over time 
(see, for example, Simarro et al., 2008; WHO, 2013;   
Ruiz et al., 2008; Figure 1, page 28). Although the 
curve takes different forms in individual endemic 
countries, this emblematic continental graph conveys 
a particular message about the history of this disease, 
which has had far-reaching consequences on how 
disease control is understood today. 
Sleeping sickness is often seen as a quintessential 
colonial disease (Lyons, 1992): with a continental peak 
of 60,000 cases in 1930, controlling the disease and its 
tsetse fly vector were core imperial priorities. Control 
of the most prevalent form of sleeping sickness, 
gambiense, was achieved through a succession of 
strategies involving coercive measures that reflected 
broader patterns of political domination: forced 
resettlement, denuding of land supporting tsetse, 
years-long internment of patients in isolation centres, 
treatment with extremely toxic medicines, punishments 
for chiefs that did not present their populations for 
medical inspection and mass prophylactic injections.1  
Today, the most well-known method from this period 
is medical inspection (now referred to as mass or 
active screening) by mobile teams operating in Central 
Africa. Designed by military physicians to achieve 
near 100% population coverage, this strategy worked 
so well, so the story goes, that Africa came close 
to eliminating the disease by the 1960s and found 
itself at the bottom of the ‘U’. The near-success of 
elimination coincided with independence for many 
African states, however, and these new governments 
had other priorities, but also wanted to distance 
themselves from the coercive practices associated 
with colonial methods (De Raadt, 2005). Control 
programmes thus collapsed. When sleeping sickness 
resurged to its second peak of over 30,000 annual 
cases during the civil wars in Central Africa in the 
late 1990s, contemporary histories recount how 
medical humanitarian organisations, particularly 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), were the only actors 
with sufficient interest and means to re-engage with 
the disease (Corty, 2011). This second continental 
epidemic was successfully controlled, again via mass 
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1 Sleeping sickness control by colonial authorities in Southern 
Sudan has been reviewed by scientists involved in these colonial 
programmes (Maurice, 1930; Bloss, 1960) and by historians 
since then (Bayoumi, 1979; Bell, 1999; Leonardi, 2005). 
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screening. Revitalising this strategy involved creating 
a global logistical supply chain to bring diagnostic 
tools and medicines which had been improved in 
the meantime from Europe to rebel strongholds in 
Angola, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire (now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) and the Central African Republic. 
Whereas colonial public health programmes had 
struggled to secure compliance from recalcitrant 
African populations, for humanitarians the main 
struggle was with the pharmaceutical companies that 
produced the medicines needed to control this deadly 
but commercially unviable disease. But the lessons 
for history became clear: active screening is the best – 
indeed, the sole – strategy to control HAT in Africa.
Whilst this general narrative makes a strong case to 
focus minds and resources for control, it also conceals 
various important heterogeneities and inconsistent 
logics in the sleeping sickness story from place to 
place and over time. This is a problem germane to 
disease control in Africa. Lessons from past disease 
control initiatives on the continent, despite their 
long history and large scale, have remained largely 
unarticulated or misconstrued and therefore unable 
to inform contemporary efforts (Webb and Giles-
Vernick, 2013). Programme planners generally ‘have 
not sensed a first imperative to understand the worlds 
in which their projects would operate’, tending rather 
to assume that there was no need to do so because 
the disease was well understood biomedically (ibid.: 
1). This failure to take socio-cultural and geographic 
contexts into account is still plays a critical role 
in global health today. Given the essential role of 
humanitarians in controlling sleeping sickness in the 
most recent continental epidemic it is important that 
we clarify, with the benefit of hindsight and the space 
to do so outside of an outbreak and conflict situation, 
exactly how they selected disease control priorities 
from the range of different options available, and the 
assumptions on which that choice is based. Further, 
we ask how the era of humanitarian intervention 
marked a break from the colonial past, and what 
the continuities were. And, most importantly for the 
purposes of this collection of papers, what does the 
history of sleeping sickness reveal about the nature 
of humanitarian actors and their ability to carry 
Figure 1: ‘U’-shaped epidemiological curve of sleeping sickness cases in Africa, 1927–97 
 
Source: Simarro, P. P., J. Jannin and P. Cattand (2008) ‘Eliminating Human African Trypanosomiasis: Where Do We Stand and What Comes 
Next?’, PLoS Med 5(2): e55. 
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out complex, long-term projects such as continental 
disease control? 
To explore these issues, we track the development 
of this story in a single place, Southern Sudan, over 
the period 1956–2005. This case is chosen in part 
because it represents a ‘ground zero’ in terms of the 
dominance of humanitarian actors – Southern Sudan’s 
two civil wars (1955–72 and 1983–2005) meant that 
state capacity for health care and disease control was 
extremely limited throughout this period, leaving 
international agencies free to act with an unusually 
broad mandate. In theory, with the civil war beginning 
a year before independence in 1956, continuities 
between the colonial and humanitarian systems should 
be easier to identify in Southern Sudan. As well as 
being of historical interest, we believe that this case is 
significant for modern priorities. Since the end of the 
civil war in 2005, most humanitarian organisations 
have ceased their involvement in sleeping sickness 
control, leaving the task to a network of other types of 
global health actors.
Although this paper does discuss the perspectives of 
those witnessing or receiving humanitarian assistance, 
it is not primarily an attempt to reconstruct a view 
of humanitarian actors ‘from below’. Such histories 
are valuable, particular as they offer a counterpoint 
to dominant humanitarian narratives. We believe 
however that the specificities of Southern Sudan require 
a different approach, not least as the fractured, multi-
actor nature of intervention in this country (formerly 
a region of Sudan) has meant that there may be less 
of a clear, dominant narrative to overturn. Instead, we 
identify which actors carried out what activities, and the 
reasons and assumptions that led them to pursue those 
strategies in an institutional and intellectual history of 
sleeping sickness in Southern Sudan. Understanding 
the decision-making of dominant actors is central to a 
critical history of this period, and allows reflection on 
those ideas and histories which may have fallen out of 
favour, or been silenced or overlooked. 
We begin with an outline of the events of the colonial 
period, which prefigure in important ways the 
period under discussion. Whilst this period involved 
widespread use of coercive methods, there were also 
other more holistic strategies, in which medical and 
environmental approaches were combined, along 
with broader attempts to encourage agricultural 
development. The remainder of this paper traces 
trends in disease control through the three dominant 
organisations active in sleeping sickness here. The 
World Health Organisation (WHO) was the dominant 
actor in the 1950s – where it pursued a medical 
strategy that continued some colonial measures, but 
tended to ignore vector control. The suspension of 
conflict in the 1970s provided WHO with a second 
opportunity to intervene, but its ambitious plans 
were thwarted by logistical difficulties. The Belgian 
Development Cooperation (1978–90) and MSF 
(1995–2005) then became active, particularly in 
experimenting with new forms of diagnostic tests and 
treatments. Significant successes were achieved with 
new medical tools and strategies, but again vector 
control remained largely neglected.
To tell this story, we use substantial archival material 
alongside interviews with key individuals to reconstruct 
the history of sleeping sickness control in Southern 
Sudan. Specifically, we consulted the WHO archives 
on Sudan (for material covering the period 1926–95), 
the South Sudan national archives in Juba (1931–78), 
the Rift Valley Institute’s Sudan Open Archive (1860–
2009), Durham University’s Sudan Archive (1950–70), 
Tvedt’s 2004 annotated bibliography of Southern Sudan 
(1850–2004), the Belgian Development Cooperation’s 
archive (1978–91) and one NGO archive (Merlin 
1996–2010), as well as relevant academic literature. 
We supplemented this material with 18 interviews 
with experts familiar with the subject, mostly active or 
retired NGO workers and civil servants. 
Colonial sleeping sickness 
administration and resistance 
(1910–54)
Sleeping sickness was most likely introduced to 
Southern Sudan in colonial times. Soldiers, labourers 
and traders are thought to have carried gambiense 
sleeping sickness from ancient endemic foci in West 
Africa into the Belgian Congo and then into the Lado 
Enclave and Uganda from the late 1880s (Lyons, 
1992; Bell, 1999; Morris, 1960). Based on extensive 
epidemics in neighbouring Uganda and Congo, 
sleeping sickness was feared by Anglo-Egyptian 
administrators and preventive control measures were 
implemented before any cases were detected. Border 
tours by British scientists in 1904–1905 identified no 
human cases (Bayoumi, 1979; Bell, 1999), but medical 
inspection posts were nevertheless established at road 
and river borders in 1909 to turn away or quarantine 
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travellers. That year, cases of sleeping sickness were 
imported with soldiers through the Congolese border 
in Raga near Darfur, but without a tsetse vector 
capable of carrying this type of sleeping sickness in 
the area local transmission was never established 
(Bloss, 1960). It was only in 1910, after the Anglo-
Egyptian government took control of part of the Lado 
Enclave containing the present-day sleeping sickness 
foci of Yei and Kajo-Keji, where cases were thought to 
have occurred since 1885 (Bell, 1999), that Southern 
Sudan inherited an epidemic of sleeping sickness (see 
Figure 2 and Figure 3). Another sleeping sickness 
focus at Nimule was brought into the country in 
1914 when colonial authorities adjusted the border 
east of the Nile for the express purpose of simplifying 
international medical governance of this riverine 
disease (Leonardi, 2005; Merkx, 2000). Sleeping 
sickness eventually spread with G.f. fuscipes tsetse 
to the margins of its existing habitat, incorporating 
Tambura, Yambio and Maridi to the north-west in 
1918, 1923 and 1941, respectively, and to Mundri, 
Torit and the outskirts of Juba in the 1970s as fuscipes 
habitat expanded north-eastwards during the first civil 
war.2, 3  All of these foci continue to yield cases today. 
2 See WHO reports: Hutchinson, M. (1975) ‘Assignment 
report: trypanosomiasis in Southern Sudan’; Snow, W. (1983) 
‘Assignment report: Tsetse distribution and ecology in relation 
to sleeping sickness in Southern Sudan, May–June 1982’, 
WHO archives SUD-MPD-005.
3 Rhodesiense sleeping sickness. which mainly infects cattle. has 
been clinically suspected in several areas of Southern Sudan 
at different points in history (Tambura during the colonial period, 
Akobo during the 1970s, Torit in the 1970s and 1980s and 
suburban Juba in 2010) (Abdel Gadir et al., 2003; Adamson, 1978; 
Archibald and Riding, 1926; Baker, 1974; Bell, 1999; Hutchinson, 
1975; Leak, 1999; Mohammed et al., 2010; Picozzi et al., 2005; 
Ruiz et al., 2008; Snow, 1983). Apart from Akobo at the Ethiopian 
border, however, human cases have never been confirmed.
Figure 2: Map showing major sleeping sickness foci in Southern Sudan 
 
Source: Simarro, P. P. et al. (2010) ‘The Atlas of Human African Trypanosomiasis: A Contribution to Global Mapping of Neglected Tropical 
Diseases’, Int J Health Geogr, 9.
Figure legend: Location of sleeping sickness cases from Southern Sudan (Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria States, which made up the 
greater Equatoria Province, as it was formerly known, in dark red) and neighbouring countries (in pale red). Spot diameters correspond to the 
approximate number of cases reported to WHO from individual villages between 2000 and 2009. While the relative numbers of cases from 
each sleeping sickness focus has changed with time, all foci established in the colonial period continue to yield cases today. Important minor 
foci include Source Yubu and Ezo within the larger Tambura area, Li Rangu and Nzara within Yambio, Ibba within Maridi, Lui within Mun-
dri and Kiri within Kajo-Keji.
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As Southern Sudan represented the northern limit 
of gambiense-transmitting tsetse habitat in the 
continent, this region was typically viewed by 
British administrators as a place where concerted 
environmental and medical intervention could beat 
back the disease entirely, out of Sudanese territory 
(Bell, 1999; Morris, 1961). Such intervention, 
however, would require much greater engagement 
with the South, beyond the existing reaches of the 
Anglo-Egyptian administration. Previously seen as 
economically insignificant and politically unstable, the 
threat of sleeping sickness is arguably what made the 
remote South of Sudan matter in Khartoum, drawing 
administrators ‘out of colonial enclaves and into the 
lives of local people’ (Bell, 1999: 29). 
During the first two decades of colonial control, 
measures were typically implemented as if they 
were military campaigns, reflecting the choices 
commonly implemented in countries where the 
epidemic was more advanced. Borders were closed, 
tsetse areas were mapped and whole populations 
were moved away from the most infested areas, 
typically onto roads cut for the purpose of sleeping 
sickness inspections. Historians have highlighted the 
coercive nature of these interventions, which involved 
forced inspections and the lengthy confinement of 
suspected patients (Bell, 1999; Leonardi, 2005). 
Later, however, more consensual methods emerged. 
As the epidemic moved into the remoter, forested 
areas of Tambura and Yambio, where state resources 
were particularly stretched, treatment camps were 
transformed into self-sustaining communities. Here, 
sleeping sickness patients were encouraged to move 
with their families, who could provide labour that 
was otherwise unavailable to the state to grow food 
for the increasing numbers of patients and to cut 
back tsetse habitat along the 10km stretch of river 
in the isolation area (Bell, 1999). Perhaps most 
importantly for colonial administrators, these isolation 
centres provided an unprecedented opportunity for 
development of the South. Dubbed ‘model villages’, 
sleeping sickness control here allowed administrators 
to live alongside affected people, both to ‘know’ 
them, as anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard sought 
to do (Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Gilles, 1976), and to 
introduce modern systems of social organisation. Here, 
wage labour was introduced alongside large-scale 
agriculture, market trading, medicine and education 
– the kind of development previously only attempted 
Figure 3: Annual numbers of sleeping sickness cases detected in Southern Sudan, 1911–2010 
Figure legend: The four major outbreaks of sleeping sickness in Southern Sudan over the last century correspond with four main events: the 
spread of sleeping sickness throughout the continent in the early part of the twentieth century, an outbreak associated with a cotton scheme in 
Yambio in the 1950s, and then two more outbreaks which began ‘silently’ while civil wars curtailed control activities. The figure depicts only 
reported cases, with case detection limited by surveillance capacity, which differed over time. National case data from 1911–97 was taken 
from WHO (2000), 1998–2005 from WHO (2007) and 2006–2010 from WHO communication, presented with permission of the Ministry 
of Health of South Sudan. No cases were reported during 1984, but data on hospital admissions to Li Rangu hospital in the Tambura focus 
suggest that around 700 cases were identified there alone (El Rayah, 2003). 
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in places like the Gezira cotton scheme in the north. 
With their strong harvests and access to salt via 
colonial supply lines, these settlements were tolerated, 
and even attracted Zande people from across the 
Congolese border (Bell, 1999).
By 1937, a decade after the country’s first major 
epidemic, a relaxation in population control for 
sleeping sickness was justified in epidemiological, 
economic and environmental terms. The 1940 
Sleeping Sickness Regulations introduced a system of 
medical passports so that border traffic was no longer 
prohibited altogether.4 Inspections were less frequent. 
Preparations began for a Southern cotton scheme 
around Yambio, which would necessitate opening 
up tsetse habitat for farming, overriding the sleeping 
sickness concerns of the previous three decades. For 
medical personnel who had any lingering fears, a new 
more efficient method of vector control had emerged 
in Kenya which promised to avoid the ‘irksome 
restrictions’ on people’s lives that resettlement and 
inspections entailed (Bloss, 1960; Hunt and Bloss, 
1945: 57). This new ‘block clearance’ method involved 
clearing only small (800 x 200-yard) sections of tsetse 
habitat along rivers to confine flies’ flight to blocks 
which could be surveilled by boys paid to catch flies.5 
Trials of the new method showed rapid and large-
scale fly suppression. They were even combined with 
a system of prophylactic suramin injections in an 
attempt at sleeping sickness elimination in Tambura 
and Kajo-Keji in 1937–41, but the drug was expensive 
and medical personnel argued that tsetse suppression 
would have a more sustainable effect on transmission.6 
This preference for environmental over medical 
methods of control was at odds with medical opinion 
in other gambiense-affected areas of Africa. By 
the 1950s, globally, sleeping sickness control was 
increasingly being discussed in terms of elimination 
because of the success of mass screening and treatment 
activities in neighbouring French Equatoria and West 
Africa (Buxton, 1949; Morris, 1961). Pentamidine 
was also being used prophylactically to protect people 
from transmission between screening rounds in French 
Equatoria and the Belgian Congo (Muraz, 1954).7  
As early as 1948, Southern Sudan was considered 
a promising site for future research on this strategy 
because of the robust hospital infrastructure that 
had been built up in endemic areas (Buxton, 1949). 
Thus, when a large-scale resurgence seemed inevitable 
in the new and economically important Yambio 
cotton scheme in 1954, even though the cause of the 
outbreak was framed in terms of increased contact 
with tsetse, medical inspections with pentamidisation 
emerged as the favoured intervention choice over 
tackling the vector (Bloss, 1960; Bayoumi, 1979).8  
The governments in Juba and Khartoum therefore 
asked the newly-formed WHO for an expert with 
pentamidisation experience.9  
WHO elimination ‘success’ and 
reconstruction failure (1955–78) 
As independence neared, mutinies erupted across 
Equatoria in 1955, igniting the first civil war (Gilles, 
1976). For sleeping sickness control, the external 
partnership brokered with WHO the year before 
to support pentamidisation was fortuitous. For one 
thing, it allowed the external financing of pentamidine 
administration on top of the medical inspections 
and treatment activities which the Anglo-Egyptian 
government had always financed, and guaranteed 
continued Sudanese government commitments 
via this international agreement. Second, through 
consultancies and formal positions in the WHO 
regional office, it allowed some of the departing 
British colonial administrators an avenue to return to 
Southern Sudan to see through the sleeping sickness 
control plans they had helped put in place. There were 
further examples, for better or worse, of the continuity 
of colonial arrangements from an earlier period. At 
WHO’s insistence, sleeping sickness programmes 
regained remarkable administrative authority in the 
name of disease control: Equatoria Province decreed 
that prophylactic injections were compulsory; chiefs 
4 See WHO reports: Hutchinson, M. (1975) ‘Assignment 
report: trypanosomiasis in Southern Sudan’; Snow, W. (1983) 
‘Assignment report: Tsetse distribution and ecology in relation 
to sleeping sickness in Southern Sudan, May–June 1982’, 
WHO archives SUD-MPD-005.
5 Anonymous, ‘Annual report 1939: special report on sleeping 
sickness’, national archives EP 96.A.1.
6 Ibid.
7 Farrell (1954) ‘Sources Yubu annual report 1953/54’, 
Durham University Sudan Archive H. B. M Farrell collection, 
SAD.627/5/11-22..
8 This was also partly on the grounds that vector control would be 
more difficult to apply in Yambio than in Tambura or Kajo-Keji, 
because of the diffuse habitat.
9 E. Haddad, ‘Trypanosomiasis control project Sudan: report on visit 
to Sudan 9 April–28 June 1955’, report to WHO, WHO archives 
Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan.
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were instructed to prosecute in court those who did 
not attend inspections and conscript them into hospital 
labour; all government soldiers in the southern region, 
even those in non-endemic areas, received two rounds 
of pentamidine; and international borders were 
policed for anyone not yet been given pentamidine.10 
Meanwhile, the vector control measures that 
had previously gone hand in hand with drug 
administration ceased. While those within Sudan had 
maintained to the end of the colonial period the idea 
that elimination would necessitate tsetse control, under 
international WHO leadership pentamidisation was 
selected as the sole strategy needed for both control of 
acute outbreaks and ‘permanent’ control in areas with 
residual transmission (Haddad, 1955).
By 1962, scientists at WHO’s first meeting of the 
Expert Committee on Trypanosomiasis declared 
pentamidisation a success, writing: ‘It can now be 
said with certainty that T. gambiense in the Sudan 
will be eradicated within a year’.11, 12   But while 
reported cases had indeed declined substantially, 
sleeping sickness was almost certainly not gone in 
1963.13 WHO’s withdrawal of support that year 
was more likely related to the intensification of 
the Southern conflict and the dysfunctional post-
independence politics in Khartoum (Cockett, 2010). 
With the consolidation of rebel movements in 1963, 
conflict in Equatoria became entrenched and expanded 
to the other Southern provinces. Simultaneously, 
large numbers of expatriates were expelled from the 
country, including many missionaries who had been 
providing the majority of non-governmental support to 
healthcare in the South (Cockett, 2010). After WHO’s 
withdrawal, Sudanese hospital staff continued sleeping 
sickness control as best they could with remaining 
stocks of medicine, but the ability to screen patients 
systematically largely collapsed.14 
When Sudanese President Jafaar Nimeiri switched 
allegiances to Western, and particularly US, actors 
in 1971, a peace agreement with the South swiftly 
followed, ushering in the country’s first full-scale, 
Western-led humanitarian response. Most scholars 
consider this moment as marking the emergence of 
welfare privatisation in Southern Sudan as Khartoum 
sought to contract-out social services to international 
agencies (Large, 2012; Johnson, 2011). UN plans for 
rehabilitating the South after 17 years of war entailed 
funnelling $20 million in the first year alone to 180,000 
refugees and 500,000 people displaced internally by 
the war. Faith-based organisations were influential in 
drawing global attention to a suspected resurgence 
of sleeping sickness at the end of the war.15  This 
resurgence was in the same south-western area that 
WHO pentamidisation campaigns had focused on at 
the beginning of the war, but advocacy at this time 
did not frame the problem in terms of a failure of 
strategy. Rather, humanitarians focused on the urgent 
need to address the epidemic of ‘madness’ reported 
from ‘areas hard hit by the disturbances’.16 They 
pointed to the apathy of neighbouring governments in 
tackling the problem in refugees and criticised British 
pharmaceutical companies for stopping production 
of sleeping sickness drugs for use in the UK’s former 
colonies (L’Etang, 1975). At the request of the Sudanese 
government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) therefore granted sleeping sickness control its 
own $81,000 budget line, with WHO expected to fund 
the difference and work out the details.17  
The WHO regional office supporting Sudan (the Eastern 
Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO)) responded 
quickly, drafting a comprehensive proposal incorporating 
state of the art serological and parasitological diagnostic 
technologies forecast to cost $193,000 over three years 
(see Table 1 outlining other elements of WHO plans).18 
Although ambitious, the plan stopped short of proposing 
elimination, which was no longer considered feasible. 
10 ‘Agreement between the World Health Organisation and the 
Government of Sudan for a trypanosomiasis control project’, 
1955, national archives Zande District SS file 1953-78, ZD 
96.B.1.
11 K. R. S Morris (1962) ‘“Addendum” to “The relation of 
trypanosomiasis to agricultural, forestry, veterinary and other 
activities in the Sudan”, report to WHO Expert Committee on 
Trypanosomiasis, WHO archives, Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan.
12 Pentamidisation was later discredited as having little protective 
effect against new infections and even inhibiting case-detection 
efforts by masking parasitemia (Pepin and Labbe, 2008; 
Stanghellini, 1999).
13 Forty-three and 20 cases were reported in the last two 
years of the programme from Yei and Tambura, respectively 
(Hutchinson, 1975, report to WHO). 
14 Hutchinson, 1975 report to WHO.
15 Letter from M. Louise Pirouet to Roelsgaard (1972) and P. L. 
Giacometti (1973) ‘Assignment report: Public health advisory 
services in the Southern Sudan, communicable diseases, 20 
January–12 May 1973’, WHO archives, Trypano1-EMRO-
Sudan.
16 Ibid.
17 R. Moltu to S. A. Abier (7 September 1972) ‘Unicef assistance 
to South Sudan’, national archives, High Executive Council, 
HEC.90.A.1.
18 Regional Director EMRO to L. Bernard (1973) ‘Proposal for 
trypanosomiasis control project in Southern Sudan under 
FT arrangements financed by UNHCR’ and associated 
correspondence, WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005, 13/04/1973.
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The plan, however, never really materialised, despite 
visits by WHO personnel in 1973, 1974 and 1978, and 
the director of sleeping sickness at WHO headquarters 
personally redrafting it in 1976.19 Individuals within 
WHO were some of the most vocal critics of this 
failure; two European staff assigned to work on the 
programme in Maridi and Yambio eventually resigned 
in exasperation at ‘administrative delays’.20 One of the 
main problems appeared to be the year-long wait at Port 
Sudan customs for lab equipment and supplies, which 
crippled screening and capacity-building activities.21 By 
1978, sleeping sickness in Yambio had become so acute 
that one WHO staffer argued they could no longer 
wait for external assistance, highly trained personnel or 
a ‘magic screening formula’.22 In this case, the staffer 
recommended relying on only the simplest and swiftest 
techniques (mainly cervical lymph node puncture) which 
had already been proven during colonial and WHO 
pentamidisation campaigns. This recommendation 
furthermore fitted in with a new framing for sleeping 
sickness which WHO promoted through the 1980s 
around integration of control activities into primary 
healthcare structures,23 part of a wider institutional focus 
on rural primary healthcare (WHO, 1987).
Others in Yambio were also critical of WHO’s seeming 
inability to mount a response. An international NGO 
working in Yambio, Caritas, for example, had been 
reporting cases to WHO since 1973. In the absence of 
the promised UN intervention, Caritas had resorted to 
borrowing sleeping sickness equipment and drugs from 
the Belgian Development Cooperation (BDC)’s bilateral 
programme in neighbouring Zaire (Akol, 1981). Belgian 
scientists brought in from Zaire were scathing of the 
WHO response, estimating that the delay had cost 
3,000 new infections at a price of $1.2 million, which 
the Belgian government now had to fund (Akol, 1981). 
The Southern Regional Government, at least in the 
most affected areas, also found ways of making do 
without the technologies of the UN programme by 
returning to interventions known from the colonial 
period. Between 1975 and 1977, at the request of 
Yambio area chiefs, the Commissioner of Western 
Equatoria initiated a series of radical environmental 
and population control measures, framed as a 
national duty in the ‘War against Sleeping Sickness’.24 
19 Regional Director EMRO to P. de Raadt (19 February 1976) 
‘Revised plan of operation for a trypanosomiasis control 
project, Southern Sudan’, WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005.
20 See Hutchinson’s 1974 and 1975 reports and various 
correspondence in 1975–76 in WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005; 
see also Binz’s 1975 and Lapeysonnie’s 1978 reports in WHO 
archives, Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan.
21 L. Lapeyssonie (1974) ‘Report on a visit to Sudan: 3–30 June 
1974’ report to WHO-EMRO, WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005.
22 L. Lapeyssonie (1978) ‘Assignment report on human trypano-
somiasis control in Southern Sudan: December 1977–March 
1978’, report to WHO, WHO archives, Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan.
23 Ibid.; see also WHO correspondence from 1983 with German 
primary health care programme in Equatoria, WHO archives, 
CTD/TRY T7/360/6.SUD.
24 D. Tek to Inspector Local Government’s Office Zande District 
Yambio (30 November 1977), national archives, Zande District 
SS file, ZD 96.B.1.
Table 1: Key elements of WHO’s post-war sleeping sickness reconstruction plans (1970s)
1. Lab personnel training in:
 • Serological diagnostic methods (capillary haemagglutination, latex agglutination, immunofluorescence)
 • Parasitological diagnostic methods (identification of parasites in body fluids using simple microscopy and in buffy  
  coat isolated through centrifugation)
 • Animal inoculation and blood culture diagnostic methods
2. Treatment at hospitals and field stations
3. Establishment of mobile screening teams
4. Pentamidine chemoprophylaxis campaigns
5. Census of population at risk
6. Entomological, socio-economic, epidemiological and cost–benefit studies
7. Coordination with neighbouring country sleeping sickness programmes, liaison with WHO reference labs
8. Design of long-term control programme
Table legend: Information comes from plans and correspondence in the WHO Southern Sudan sleeping sickness file 1973–83. Not all 
control programme elements appeared in all WHO plans and individuals debated the appropriateness of particular elements (such as 
chemoprophylaxis) throughout the decade.
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Strategies included financial penalties for people 
who did not attend inspections or absconded from 
treatment (when it was available), making it illegal 
for Zairean traders who could be infected to sell in 
Sudanese markets and compelling chiefs to clear tsetse 
habitat from streams and citizens to clear bushes from 
around their compounds. A sleeping sickness tax was 
levied to fund these efforts.25  
Reimagining and relegating  
fly control 
From this point on in Southern Sudan, WHO appears 
to have given up pursuing the idea of direct provision 
or financing of sleeping sickness services, as planned in 
the immediate post-war reconstruction period. Instead, 
the main activities it engaged in over the next decade 
were epidemiological and entomological assessments 
of sleeping sickness risk associated with development 
and humanitarian interventions. Investigations at 
Ture forest station near Kajo-Keji, a plantation in 
Maridi, a proposed cattle ranch at Loa and camps for 
Ugandan refugees near Nimule, for example, all paid 
considerable attention to how changes in the natural 
environment could influence transmission.26 A WHO 
entomologist deployed to the Belgian programme in 
the 1980s furthermore sought to revisit and reimagine 
colonial tsetse control methods that could be applied 
there.27 In Tambura, the ‘blocks’ along rivers where 
tsetse habitat had been cleared in the late 1930s near 
the town were identified and recleared. Rather than 
recruiting boys to catch flies by hand, the entomologist 
designed a trial of insecticide-impregnated cloth targets 
to attract and kill flies – the first for control of G 
fuscipes in Africa.28 In Yambio, where resettlement 
or pentamidisation were previously the only control 
options considered, detailed entomological and human 
screening surveys suggested that most transmission 
occured at particular wells dug in the forest. Medical 
screening therefore incorporated a team of people on 
bicycles to erect and maintain fly targets around these 
specific hotspots. 
This disease control contribution by WHO was 
important given the Belgian programme’s restricted 
geographic focus to areas bordering Zaire (mainly 
Yambio and Tambura) and, particularly, their 
prioritisation of medical responses. Unlike in 
some West African settings, however, where tsetse 
trapping gained popularity because the French 
Office of Scientific and Technical Research Overseas 
(ORSTOM) promoted vector control as an alternative 
to coercive screening methods in the 1970s, trapping 
was not taken up in a major way here (Laveissiere 
and Penchenier, 2005). By and large, these WHO 
assessments and plans gave rise to little substantive 
non-medical activity (see Table 2), with vector control 
typically consigned to a supporting role. Entomological 
surveys, for example, were characterised in WHO 
reports as only useful to delimit an area needed for 
medical intervention or to increase its efficiency 
by decreasing the number of repeated population 
screenings needed to control disease. 
As the humanitarian crisis grew over the next 
decade, vector control fell even further out of 
favour. Although Merlin later led a trapping 
project in Tambura in 1997 (Joya and Okoli, 2001, 
Moore and Richer, 2001), subsequent proposals 
to expand the programme to Yambio and Maridi 
went unfunded (interview with NGO staff, 2006), 
reflecting uncertainty about the economics of vector 
control in humanitarian interventions across the 
continent (Trowbridge et al., 2001; Shaw, 2005). A 
similar pattern seems to have prevailed in the 1980s, 
when UNHCR officials declined to fund a vector 
control programme requested by Ugandan refugees 
in Yei (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 58, 333). Moreover, 
environmental considerations and vector control 
recommendations are noticeably absent from any of 
the WHO sleeping sickness assessments that have 
taken place in the last three decades.29 
25 By the time of another WHO visit in 1978, SDG 300 had been 
raised for this fund by leaders WHO staff characterised as 
‘enthusiastic but inexperienced’ in sleeping sickness control 
(Lapeysonnie, 1978 report to WHO). WHO staff evidently felt 
responsible for offering guidance so that these funds would 
be spent efficiently, but further information on either the 
guidance offered or how these funds were eventually spent is 
unavailable.
26 See reports by Hutchinson (1975), Lapeyssonie (1978) and 
Snow (1983 and 1984) in WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005 and 
Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan. 
27 Snow, 1984 report to WHO.
28 Unfortunately, because records stop, it is unclear whether this 
planned trial took place. Merlin records, however, suggest that 
the fly-boys from the colonial period were rehired for a short 
period to teach hand-catching techniques.
29 See, for example, reports by Ranque and Cattand (1995) to 
WHO in WHO archives, Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan; reports by 
Ruiz (2005) to Merlin and Postigo (2009) to WHO in the Merlin 
archive, as well as published assessments by Ruiz-Postigo et 
al. (2012) and WHO (2004).
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Belgian medical tools in a 
humanitarian space (1978–90)
Throughout the 1980s, serodiagnosis and treatment 
was the mainstay of the BDC’s control strategy in 
Southern Sudan. Modern serodiagnostics, a category of 
simple agglutination assays which screen for antibodies 
associated with infection, rather than the parasite 
itself, and thus require no laborious microscopy, were 
introduced into routine practice in Southern Sudan in the 
early 1980s – before anywhere else in Africa. Ironically, 
although serodiagnosis was primarily developed by 
Belgian scientists in the 1970s (Magnus et al., 1978; 
Wery et al., 1970), it could not be used in formerly 
‘Belgian’ areas of Africa, namely Zaire/Congo, where 
the BDC had a large programme, until the mid-1990s 
because of ideological opposition (interview with former 
BDC staff, 2015). Since Zaire was the most endemic 
country in Africa, it also possessed the largest number 
of experts (both Congolese and Belgian), who were 
convinced through long experience that sleeping sickness 
could be most efficiently controlled through traditional 
microscopy. Deployment in the cross-border satellite 
Belgian programme in Sudan, however, allowed less 
experienced Belgian doctors, some of whom had recent 
Sleeping sickness 
focus 
Type of medical 
screening 
recommended 
Type of vector control 
recommended 
Activities successfully 
implemented (by 1990)
Tambura As precautionary measure 
(1975) 
Exploratory survey (1975), 
depletion trapping (1983), 
habitat clearance around 
streams in towns and trial 
of screens (1984) 
Partial medical screening 
with CATT, some depletion 
trapping by fly boys
Yambio As emergency control 
measure (1975)  
Exploratory survey 
(1975), aerial spraying by 
helicopter (1978), depletion 
trapping (1983) 
Full medical screening 
with CATT, entomological 
surveys, study of water 
source-related infection 
risk, elaboration of new 
Yambio-specific vector 
control method focused on 
wells, sticky screens pilot
Maridi Exploratory (1975) Depletion trapping (1983) Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation
Yei As precautionary measure 
(1975) 
Exploratory survey 
(1975) 
Kajo-Keji  Exploratory survey 
(1983) 
Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation
Juba area (incl Rokon, 
Loka, Sindiru) 
Exploratory (1983) Exploratory survey (1983), 
aerial survey of tsetse 
habitat 
Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation.
Nimule Spot surveys (1975) and 
as precautionary measure 
(1984)  
Exploratory survey (1975, 
1984) 
Torit  Exploratory (1983) Exploratory survey (1975, 
1983) 
Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation.
Akobo Spot surveys (1975)  
Table 2: Inter-war medical survey and vector control work recommended by WHO and 
implemented, by focus
Table legend: Information comes from correspondence found in the WHO archive, particularly reports written by Hutchinson (1975), 
Lapeyssonie (1975 and 1978) and Snow (1983 and 1984), as well as correspondence in the Belgian and Merlin project archives.
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training at the tropical medicine institute in Antwerp, to 
take up new innovations such as the serodiagnostic card 
agglutination test for trypanosomiasis (CATT test). The 
Sudan programme became a kind of haven for Belgians 
who did not fit into their own country’s programmatic 
culture in Zaire. Similarly, doctors from this programme 
reported some of the first field observations of today’s 
late stage sleeping sickness drugs, nifurtimox and 
eflornithine (Van Nieuwenhove et al., 1985; Van 
Nieuwenhove and Declercq, 1981). 
WHO global technical reports from this period suggest a 
reluctance to endorse these technologies for use in country 
programmes without wider validation (particularly of  
the medicines (WHO, 1979, WHO, 1986)). By 1983, 
however, the BDC’s demonstration of CATT test 
feasibility contributed to a change in global thinking To  
WHO, the CATT test promised an even better entry-point 
than simple microscopy to attract a wider network of  
actors into sleeping sickness control under a framework 
of integrated healthcare, and Southern Sudan was viewed  
as politically stable enough to host such a pilot project. 
The re-emergence of conflict shortly afterwards, however,  
appears to have moderated some of this enthusiasm (for  
example, a proposed large-scale bilateral German invest-
ment went unfunded). Rather, under BDC leadership and 
the support of a new national control programme office 
in Juba, staff in existing NGO-supported hospital-based 
programmes across the rest of Equatoria were trained 
and equipped to do passive detection and treatment, but 
only using simple microscopy. Even with BDC help, the 
logistics of using the CATT test in this new conflict setting 
were deemed too difficult. 
For individuals in the Sudanese government, the 
BDC’s use of unconventional technologies appears 
to have justified rare moments of programmatic 
regulation or interference in a collaboration which 
otherwise functioned effectively to win international 
support. In 1985, for example, the Ministry of 
International Health in Khartoum threatened to close 
the BDC programme upon discovering they were 
using unapproved medicines (which the Southern 
government condoned for compassionate reasons).30  
In contrast, a perceived unfairness in access to the 
BDC technologies was behind an investigation by 
the Southern government.31 In 1986, the Provincial 
Governor of Western Equatoria, reportedly tired 
of international organisations taking unilateral 
decisions, colluded with an ex-employee of the Belgian 
programme to embellish reports of a sleeping sickness 
outbreak in Maridi neighbouring the BDC programme 
to embarrass the Belgians and demand more 
attention from the government. A key finding of this 
investigation was popular demand for tsetse control.
An emphasis on vector control, as well as expanded 
screening coverage of foci across the Equatoria region, 
was therefore among the objectives in the Southern-
supported BDC’s proposal for a five-year extension 
of its programme in 1988.32 Development officials in 
Brussels, however, declined to renew the programme 
in a bid to consolidate the BDC’s sleeping sickness 
work in Zaire and Rwanda. For reasons never known 
to project leaders on the ground, the programme 
continued to receive unofficial support, and the centres 
in Yambio and Juba were able to keep basic medical 
screening activities going for another two and a half 
years until fighting reached project areas in December 
1990 and the team evacuated to Zaire (interview with 
former BDC staff, 2015). 
Humanitarians and the new best 
practice (1990–2005)
From 1986, MSF began to lead its own sleeping 
sickness interventions for displaced Southern Sudanese 
in Uganda. Individuals encountering sleeping sickness 
during this period felt themselves to be operating in 
a vacuum, without good tools or guidance on best 
practice (Corty, 2011; d’Alessandro, 2009). In one 
hospital, MSF staff systematically conducted lumbar 
punctures on patients to prove to themselves that the 
Belgian CATT test could be trusted (a practice known 
from, but not followed since, the colonial period and 
contrary to longstanding WHO advice) (Interview 
with researcher associated with MSF programme, 
2015). Eventually MSF engaged in a large global 
research and advocacy programme around medical 
innovations for sleeping sickness. Many of these (the 
CATT, eflornithine and nifurtimox) were being used 
in Southern Sudan, but on a small scale or informally. 
MSF emphasised transforming systems to support 
their use: validating tools in formal clinical trials 30 J. Vermer to Forman (13 November 1985), WHO archives, 
T7-370-6SUD [translation].
31 C. Lado to Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (1987) 
‘Trip report to Western Equatoria, 17–27 Jan 1987’, Belgian 
Development Cooperation (BDC) archives.
32 Anonymous (1988), ‘[Project fact sheet: sleeping sickness 
control project in Sudan]’, BDC archives.
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so that they could be endorsed by WHO and more 
easily accepted into national programmes, pressing 
manufacturers to commit to producing medicines 
and diagnostics at scale and establishing a strong, 
sustainable global logistics supply chain (Corty, 2011). 
Unlike during the war of the 1960s and 1970s, 
humanitarian organisations including MSF were 
eventually able to mount a robust response which 
far exceeded WHO’s 1995 proposal for a renewed 
network of basic integrated care providers.33 As we 
discuss elsewhere (Palmer et al., 2014), the need 
for complex tools and expertise to control sleeping 
sickness was one of the factors that attracted MSF 
to the disease. Through a programme of clinical and 
operational research, much of it carried out in Sudan 
itself (Chappuis, 2002, 2004; Balasagaram, 2006, 2009; 
Maina, 2006, 2007; Priotto, 2008, 2012; Checchi, 
2012), MSF developed a system of good practice 
adapted to the Sudanese context and others like it. Over 
time, MSF became the global thought-leader on what 
was considered most ethical in a humanitarian sleeping 
sickness response. By demonstrating this practice and 
sharing its tools, MSF drew in other actors to multiply 
and sustain the response, including international 
organisations such as Malteser (in Yei since 2002) and 
Merlin (in Tambura in 1997 and Nimule since 2005), 
which are still present in endemic areas today. From 
the early 2000s, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association (SRRA), the humanitarian arm of the 
Southern rebels, became involved in coordination. After 
the end of the war in 2005, the Neglected Tropical 
Diseases Directorate within the Ministry of Health was 
formed partially because of the need to coordinate such 
large-scale responses to sleeping sickness (interview with 
Ministry of Health, 2014). In contrast, the substantial 
expertise in tsetse control developed by Khartoum-
based academics (e.g. Mohammed et al. (2010)), was 
taken up by neither humanitarian actors during the civil 
war period nor the Southern government afterwards.
As a medical organisation, it should not be surprising 
that MSF preferred a primarily medical approach 
to control, based on population screening and 
treatment. MSF has never strongly advocated a vector 
control approach to sleeping sickness (Corty, 2011), 
and many of the colonial-era approaches, such as 
forcible resettlement or the taxing of endemic areas 
to fund control, as advocated by Yambio chiefs in 
the 1970s, would be antithetical to its humanitarian 
principles. That said, when MSF first engaged in 
sleeping sickness control among refugees from Sudan 
in 1986, its response was strongly influenced by the 
work of a colonial French military doctor and Nobel 
Prize nominee, Eugene Jamot (ASNOM, 2001; Louis 
et al., 2002; Milleliri, 2004). Jamot’s systematic 
population screening strategy was a good fit with 
the organisational culture guiding MSF’s emergency 
medical interventions at this time, which sought 
to adapt innovations from emergency and military 
services (Vidal and Pinel, 2011). MSF’s understanding 
or assessment of local and continental sleeping 
sickness history was thus specific to its preferred way 
of working: Jamot had shown that sleeping sickness 
control was best done via mass screening and the 
epidemic MSF was seeing could be explained by war 
interrupting Belgian activities. More mass screening 
was thus the answer. This is important given that many 
of MSF’s norms related to sleeping sickness control 
have been adopted by others and persist beyond the 
acute conflict phase today (Palmer et al., 2014). 
Conclusion
The tumultuous political history of Southern Sudan 
has meant that efforts to control sleeping sickness there 
have been both unique and uneven. Be it prophylactic 
injections, insecticide-treated targets, serodiagnostics 
or new medicines, we have discussed many examples 
of how, in periods of both conflict and calm, Southern 
Sudan was seen as an ideal place to test new strategies 
because of the right combination of endemicity, 
infrastructure and willing actors. It is also a history 
that complicates in important ways the general 
story of sleeping sickness in Africa. For instance, a 
common narrative is that the post-colonial period saw 
disengagement with sleeping sickness control on the 
part of post-independence African governments, largely 
because they disliked the coercive practices of colonial 
administrations (ASNOM, 2001; De Raadt, 2005; 
Pepin and Labbe, 2008; Laveissiere and Penchenier, 
2005). Yet in the Southern Sudanese case, many of 
the more intrusive practices had been relaxed by the 
colonial authorities by the late 1930s: it was WHO-led 
ideas on how elimination should be pursued that led to 
the reintroduction of large-scale population restrictions. 
The contingencies of the first civil war meant that 
these measures could not be pursued at scale, but local 
33 P. Ranque and P. Cattand travel report to WHO (1995). Several 
contemporary reviews of these interventions exist (Moore, 
1999; Moore and Richer, 2001; Trowbridge et al., 2001; Pagey, 
2003; Ruiz-Postigo et al., 2012; Ruiz et al., 2008).
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government authorities nonetheless did what they 
could to continue these practices, particularly when 
neither the national government nor international 
organisations were present to respond to local sleeping 
sickness control needs. Punishment (of various kinds) 
for people who did not attend screenings (and their 
chiefs) continued until at least 1978. Even today, 
Zande chiefs in the Tambura area have the authority to 
impose fines on people who do not keep paths to their 
homes clean (Allen, 2007).
As well as contributing to a more nuanced narrative 
of sleeping sickness in the twentieth century, the 
Southern Sudan case has implications for the ways 
in which we think about the capacities, blind spots 
and limitations of international humanitarian 
actors. If the main story, as we have argued, is the 
progressive medicalisation of the response to the 
epidemic, and the neglect of vector control, what 
are the assumptions that have underpinned that 
perspective? And what does this reveal about the 
nature of humanitarian intervention in Southern 
Sudan and elsewhere? We propose that there are three 
more general issues that demand further reflection: 
the pattern of successive actors taking control, an 
increasing exclusion of indigenous perspectives and 
knowledge and a preference for portable technologies.
Firstly, the fact that the above narrative can be divided 
relatively straightforwardly into periods delineated by 
different dominant actors – the colonial era, the WHO 
era and so on – is itself revealing. The outbreak and 
cessation of war led to the involvement of different 
actors at different times, mostly notably with WHO 
most comfortable and capable of acting in times of 
calm, whilst MSF gained momentum – and spurred 
major innovations – in periods of conflict and crisis. 
As different actors came and went, interest was 
lost not only in vector control, but also in schemes 
which integrated disease control and agricultural 
development. If it is a truism that development and 
humanitarian actors often fail to adequately learn 
from historical examples (Davey et al., 2013; Porter 
et al., 1991), this is especially so when institutional 
turnover is so marked. It is, after all, harder to learn 
from the mistakes of others.
This difficulty in securing long-term continuity of 
knowledge and planning is, ironically, at odds with 
discussions of the role of NGOs in Southern Sudan 
in other histories. Tvedt, for instance, argues that 
the long-term presence of international actors had 
a ‘crowding out’ effect as ‘NGOs unintentionally 
contributed to the erosion of the authority of a 
very weak state’ (Tvedt, 1998: 189). Others have 
expressed concern that the size and longstanding 
presence of aid would have a distorting effect, perhaps 
even contributing to a political economy of conflict 
(Duffield, 1993; Duffield, 2002; Macrae et al., 1997). 
Thus, whilst humanitarian actors tackling emergencies 
have sometimes been accused of causing problems by 
staying too long, the very different timescales involved 
in long-term disease control mean that even decade-
long interventions end up being too short. Ultimately, 
this may be a limitation of any humanitarian aid: 
perhaps only nation states are fully capable of the 
multigenerational learning and planning necessary to 
comprehensively tackle complex diseases.
A second revealing feature of this era is the extent 
to which methods of sleeping sickness control were 
determined predominantly according to external 
priorities, rather than sustained consideration of what 
had worked (or not) in the past. What is so striking 
about the progressive medicalisation of sleeping 
sickness control in Southern Sudan, is that, with all of 
the country’s attractiveness to test new innovations, the 
shift took place seemingly with very little circling back 
to examine strategy, or reconsideration of the benefits 
of alternative methods. The clearest example of this is 
WHO’s decision to use pentamidisation as a solution to 
the second Sudanese outbreak defined by actors on the 
ground as a problem of increased contact with tsetse 
because of cotton scheme resettlements. Then, when 
WHO re-entered a decade later, their approach to the 
third epidemic focused on laboratory capacity-building 
with seemingly little reflection on whether and why 
pentamidisation had failed, or whether tsetse control 
might be appropriate (see Table 3). In rare cases where 
actors did attempt to rethink their approach (for 
instance, at various points with WHO in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Belgian Development Corporation in 
1988 and the unfunded Merlin proposal in 1997), 
such dissenting perspectives conspicuously failed to 
find purchase. This seems all the more striking in 
comparison with, say, the vigorous and wide-ranging 
debates regarding HIV and Ebola control strategies.
How can this seemingly single-minded pursuit of a 
narrow strategy be accounted for? We argue that 
it is related to the weakness of Southern Sudanese 
institutions. Whilst there have long been powerful 
actors in global health, social scientists have regularly 
highlighted the ability of African nations, professionals 
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and publics to deflect and modify global agendas (for a 
theoretical framework see Ong and Collier (2005), and 
for recent examples see the essays in Geissler (2015)). 
However, Southern Sudan represents an extreme 
case given the prolonged and serious weaknesses of 
organised capacity to modify and resist programmes 
‘from above’. In this sense, the chains of decision-
making by international actors that we have described 
offer a glimpse of global health and humanitarian 
processes in their purest, least attenuated forms. 
This relatively unchecked globalism is assisted, we 
argue, by a set of rhetorical moves that emphasise 
Southern Sudan as an ahistorical, unknowable space, 
one easily conceived of as a blank slate. For instance, 
in modern policy discussions it is often suggested 
that, whilst the limited institutions of the new South 
Sudan state are obviously a developmental weakness, 
this situation nonetheless provides an opportunity for 
addressing problems unencumbered by the inertia of 
pre-existing bureaucracies and priorities.34 This trope 
(almost a cliché, such is the frequency with which it is 
repeated) may be true in certain circumstances, but was 
paradoxically also a view that was seemingly shared 
by past actors. By ignoring a long tradition of vector 
control-centric and integrated developmental approaches 
to sleeping sickness, actors reveal a tacit assumption 
that little significant prior work had been done, and that 
little relevant local knowledge or capacity existed.
This reluctance to engage with (or simply ignorance 
of) the prior histories of disease control goes hand in 
hand with a third key trend – a marked preference 
for portable technologies that avoid political 
entanglements. By portable, we mean ‘humanitarian 
goods’ in the sense of both tangible products that 
provide relief or care of some kind (of which a 
serodiagnostic tool is a key example) or programmatic 
strategies (such as mobile teams with prophylactic 
pentamidine) that avoid the need to build systems 
and infrastructures. Like other humanitarian goods 
such as nutritional food additives (Scott-Smith, 2013), 
diagnostic tools and mobile teams offer the prospect 
of a technical humanitarianism which need not engage 
with longer-term questions of planning, livelihoods 
and sustainability. As Peter Redfield has argued, 
MSF’s preference for standardised methods, kits 
and mobile teams ‘represents a mobile, transitional 
variety of limited intervention, modifying and partially 
reconstructing a local environment around specific 
artefacts and a set script’ (Redfield, 2011: 281; 
emphasis added). Again, the shift from earlier broad 
approaches to screening and treatment represents both 
confidence in the power of improved diagnostics and 
drugs to tackle a problem, but also the reluctance of 
humanitarian actors to engage more broadly.
In conclusion, we have argued that Southern Sudan 
has seen an unusual pattern of humanitarian activity 
in response to sleeping sickness. The progressive 
medicalisation we have described was not simply an 
inevitable outcome as technologies evolved – other 
major African disease control projects such as malaria, 
and indeed sleeping sickness elsewhere on the continent, 
have continued to emphasise environmental methods. 
Rather, the European-driven, medical and technocratic 
methodology we identify became progressively 
more entrenched in response to a particular set of 
circumstances and assumptions. The perception, 
accurate or otherwise, that Southern Sudan lacks a 
tradition of disease control and the presence of (or 
even medium-term possibility for) health infrastructure 
Table 3: Sequence of theories about sleeping sickness outbreaks and the predominant  
control strategies 
Outbreak Theories about cause Control measures taken
1920s British: Spill-over from neighbouring countries British: Border control, isolation of communities and 
  patients, tsetse habitat destruction, mass screening
1950s British: Population resettlement to support  British: Mass screening with pentamidisation
 agricultural scheme
1970/80s NGOs and WHO: Chaos of war and apathy  Local government: Tsetse habitat destruction
 of international actors  WHO: Capacity-building for lab systems 
  Belgians: Mass screening with new diagnostic
1990/2000s NGOs and WHO: Interruption of Belgian  MSF: Mass screening with improved global support 
 mass screening programme
34 In the context of neglected disease, see for example (Rumunu 
et al., 2009; Ruiz et al., 2008;, and in the context of land 
tenure, see Badiey (2013).
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has encouraged actors to focus on global tools over 
domestic systems.
Much has been achieved in controlling sleeping 
sickness in Southern Sudan, despite the very 
unpromising circumstances. We certainly hope this 
history does not read as a chastisement of successive 
generations of humanitarians who have acted with 
great courage and integrity. Instead, we argue that 
the unique circumstances of this case have rendered 
certain widespread trends in humanitarianism 
particularly legible, specifically the emergence of 
innovative tools and portable technologies which have 
the power to heal and care, but also a tendency to 
displace other approaches and perspectives. Future 
projects and research, we believe, must engage with 
history to explore more integrated approaches, in 
which transnational flows of expertise and resources 
can be more precisely calibrated towards the complex 
contingencies of local need.
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